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Introduction 
 
The 2003 California recall election provides a unique opportunity to assess the impact of 
variations in ballot design and voting methods on the voting accuracy of citizens.  
Analysis of the results of the California Recall election demonstrates that candidates who 
were vertically adjacent to the top three vote getters received “extra” votes in the recall 
election – a vertical proximity effect.  Combined, these ‘neighbor’ candidates received 
approximately 4 votes per thousand votes the top candidate received.  The pattern is 
consistent across the candidates neighboring Schwarzenegger, Bustamante, and 
McClintock, and is noticeably higher for punch cards than for optical scan or touch 
screen voting technologies. 
 
The vertical proximity effect is a variation on the theme of ballot formatting issues 
highlighted in the Florida recount of the 2000 presidential elections.  Although there are 
many possible explanations for this pattern, we think they are caused by difficulties 
voters have aligning names with voting options.  For example, lefthanders might have 
greater difficulty than right-handers aligning the hole in the punch card with the name; 
and people with poor vision might have difficulty with alignment in all technologies.  
While 4 erroneously cast votes in 1000 is easily the margin in a close election, this effect 
is not of the magnitude of the butterfly ballot effect documented in the Florida elections.  
That said, the appearance of clear vertical proximity effects and their variance across 
ballot types suggests that the randomization of names on the ballot in California is not 
neutral and the need remains for careful systematic evaluation of ballot designs.  
Elections are not the time to test ballot designs. 
 
Data and Methods 
 
In the 2003 election, each county was responsible for the design of its own ballot and the 
selection of its voting machines.  Technologies included punch card, optical scan and 
electronic touch-screen balloting.1  All ballots listed the candidates in order of the random 
alphabet drawn by the Secretary of State. (See Appendix A)  Empirical research on ballot 
design has documented a potential top-of-the-ballot effect, a propensity for candidates 
appearing at the top of the ballot to receive, solely by nature of their position, more votes 
than other candidates. A standard practice to correct this problem is the rotation of the 
                                                 
1 In our analysis we have excluded the paper ballots used in Alpine county, as they represent only 0.0067% 
of the voters in this election and do not constitute enough observations to provide meaningful results about 
this ballot format.  
random alphabetical ordering.  Thus, in the first Assembly district of California the 
names of candidates appear on the ballot in the random alphabetical order.  In the second 
Assembly district the first candidate of the random alphabetical list is moved to the last 
place (135) and all other candidates move up one position.  This procedure is repeated for 
each of the 80 state Assembly districts.   
 
The relative positioning of a candidate’s name remains constant across counties. 
Regardless of ordinal position, a name is surrounded by the same two “neighbor” 
candidates determined by the randomized alphabet.2 To examine the added benefit of 
proximity to a high vote-receiver, we compared the relative amount of votes neighboring 
candidates received by their position away. Using county level election returns reported 
by the California Secretary of State, the relative amount of votes was constructed by 
summing the votes of the pair of candidates who were + i, - i  positions away from the 
top candidate and dividing the number of votes they received by the number of votes the 
top candidate received, per one thousand voters.  For example: (Votes for Lawrence 
Strauss + Votes for George Schwartzman)*1000/ Votes for Arnold Schwarzenegger. This 
value was calculated for the neighboring candidates who were one, two and three 
positions away from Schwarzenegger, Bustamante and McClintock. The results are given 
in Figures 1, 2 and 3.3 These figures show the additional votes per thousand that 
neighboring candidates received, in relation to their position away from a top three vote 
getter.    
 
 
 
Figure 1. Vertical proximity effect for neighbor candidates of Schwarzenegger 
                                                 
2 The only exceptions are the assembly districts in which the candidate’s name is listed in the first position 
or in the 135th position.  Even in these two districts, the candidate will be adjacent to one of his two 
neighbor candidates, while his other adjacent spot is empty.   
3 This value was also calculated for the fourth highest vote recipient, Camejo, but at this level the results 
are within the margin of error and are not statistically significant 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Vertical proximity effect for neighbor candidates of Bustamante 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Vertical proximity effect for neighbor candidates of McClintock 
 
The consistency across candidates of the benefit vertical proximity confers is crucial to 
our result. While in absolute terms the neighbor candidates of Schwarzenegger received 
more votes than Bustamante’s neighbor candidates received, Figures 1, 2 and 3 
demonstrate that all neighbor candidates are benefiting from the same effect. The 
increase in their absolute votes is in proportion to the amount of votes their top-three 
neighbor candidate received.   A simple model of this effect is that the number of votes a 
neighbor candidate receives is the sum of their base vote (defined as the average votes 
received by all non-top vote getters) plus an additional 0.004% of the votes received by 
the top vote getting candidate they are adjacent to.  The ratio for candidates two and three 
positions away increases from Schwarzenegger to Bustamante to McClintock because the 
initial ratio of base vote to top candidate vote increases: (base vote / McClintock) > (base 
vote/Bustamante) > (base vote / Schwarzenegger), as the absolute vote of the top 
candidate decreases (McClintock < Bustamante < Schwarzenegger).   
 
Having shown this effect to be consistent across candidates, what is the causal 
mechanism underlying the increase in votes from vertical proximity?  One possible 
answer, gleaned from the lessons of the Florida 2000 Presidential recount, is voter 
alignment errors.4  The vertical proximity effect may be the result of alignment errors: 
voters see the name of the candidate they intend to vote for, but somehow instead 
accidentally mark their ballot in such a way as to cast their vote for one of the 
neighboring candidates. Bad eyesight or shaky hands could cause voters to misalign their 
decision mark with their candidate choice.  Additionally, left-handedness could 
contribute to alignment errors.5  When casting their ballots, left-handed voters often must 
position their hand in a way that covers the candidate names, which frequently appears to 
the left of the box to be marked.  Their inability to see the candidate name and box at the 
same time may result in increased error.  
 
While bad eyesight, shaky hands and left-handedness are likely to cause some alignment 
errors on any type of ballot, the punch card ballots suffer an additional propensity to 
alignment errors that is irrespective of voter characteristics: errors that result from the 
punch card being inserted into the machine incorrectly.   Indeed, many of the problems in 
the recount of the Florida presidential vote in 2000 focused on alignment errors in the 
format of the punch card ballots, which gave rise butterfly ballots and caterpillar effects. 
 
How large is the difference between punch cards and other technologies on vertical 
proximity errors in the California recall?  We estimated the differences in average 
vertical proximity effects for counties using punch cards, counties using optically 
scanned ballots, and counties using touch screen machines.  Vertical alignment effects 
were not statistically distinguishable between optical scan and touch screen technologies.  
Punch card technologies showed vertical proximity effects that were higher by almost 2 
votes per 1000.6  
 
                                                 
4 We do note that it is impossible, ex post facto, to definitively determine what kind of error was made, or 
even to distinguish errors from intentional votes for the neighbor candidate. However, we feel the statistical 
evidence is strong enough to warrant suspicion that these votes were not intentional. 
5 I thank Professor Charles Stewart for suggesting this explanation to me.   
6 Regressing the relative benefit ratio used above on dummy variables for optical scan ballots and touch 
screen ballots gives coefficients of -1.831 (s.e. 0.324) and -1.914 (s.e. 0.538) respectively, with an adjusted 
R2 of 0.380.  Since vote and ballot type data was reported in county units, this regression was weighted by 
the number of ballots.  
 
Discussion 
 
While the top-of-the-ballot effects have long been a concern, other formatting issues are 
of equal concern.  The Butterfly Ballot revealed problems with horizontal proximity.  Our 
analysis shows vertical proximity effects.  Again, punch cards seem to be somewhat 
worse than other technologies in this regard.  Horizontal and vertical proximity effects 
suggest that ballot order is not neutral, even when randomized.  There may be other 
problems, such as top of the page effects.  All of this raises questions about the practice 
of randomized order.  One interesting experimental test to run is whether a ballot 
randomized by first letter has fewer problems and biases than other orderings, such as 
alphabetic order.  
 
The more general lesson from this study is the need for thorough evaluation of ballot 
formats, leading ultimately to the design of better ballots.  Vertical proximity, as 
documented in this study, and horizontal proximity effects clearly exist.  But we have 
studied one fairly unique election with a restricted set of alignments.  The question for 
those engaged in the design of ballots is this:  What are appropriate guidelines and rules 
of thumb for minimizing the sorts of errors in evidence here and in elections past?    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A: Certified List of Candidates for the California Statewide Special Election 
held October 7, 2003 (In random alphabetical order). 
Source: California Secretary of State, http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/2003_cert_cand_list.htm 
 
Notes:  Top three vote getters are in bold; their neighbors are marked with *. 
 
Governor 
 
DAVID LAUGHING HORSE 
ROBINSON  
NED ROSCOE  
DANIEL C. RAMIREZ  
CHRISTOPHER RANKEN  
JEFF RAINFORTH  
KURT E. "TACHIKAZE" 
RIGHTMYER 
DANIEL W. RICHARDS  
KEVIN RICHTER  
REVA RENEE RENZ  
SHARON RUSHFORD  
GEORGY RUSSELL  
MICHAEL J. WOZNIAK  
DANIEL T. WATTS  
NATHAN WHITECLOUD WALTON  
MAURICE WALKER  
CHUCK WALKER  
LINGEL H. WINTERS  
C.T. WEBER  
JIM WEIR  
BRYAN QUINN  
MICHAEL JACKSON  
JOHN "JACK" MORTENSEN  
DARRYL L. MOBLEY  
JEFFREY L. MOCK  
BRUCE MARGOLIN  
GINO MARTORANA  
PAUL MARIANO  
ROBERT C. MANNHEIM  
FRANK A. MACALUSO, JR.  
PAUL "CHIP" MAILANDER  
DENNIS DUGGAN MCMAHON  
*MIKE MCNEILLY  
*MIKE P. MCCARTHY  
*BOB MCCLAIN  
TOM MCCLINTOCK  
*JONATHAN MILLER  
*CARL A. MEHR  
*SCOTT A. MEDNICK  
DORENE MUSILLI  
VAN VO  
PAUL W. VANN  
JAMES M. VANDEVENTER, JR.  
BILL VAUGHN  
MARC VALDEZ  
MOHAMMAD ARIF  
ANGELYNE  
DOUGLAS ANDERSON  
IRIS ADAM  
BROOKE ADAMS  
ALEX-ST. JAMES  
JIM HOFFMANN  
KEN HAMIDI  
SARA ANN HANLON  
IVAN A. HALL  
JOHN J. "JACK" HICKEY  
RALPH A. HERNANDEZ  
C. STEPHEN HENDERSON  
ARIANNA HUFFINGTON 
ART BROWN  
JOEL BRITTON  
AUDIE BOCK  
VIK S. BAJWA  
BADI BADIOZAMANI  
VIP BHOLA  
*JOHN W. BEARD  
*ED BEYER  
*JOHN CHRISTOPHER BURTON  
CRUZ M. BUSTAMANTE  
*CHERYL BLY-CHESTER  
*B.E. SMITH  
*DAVID RONALD SAMS  
*JAMIE ROSEMARY SAFFORD  
*LAWRENCE STEVEN STRAUSS  
ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER  
*GEORGE B. SCHWARTZMAN  
*MIKE SCHMIER  
*DARRIN H. SCHEIDLE  
BILL SIMON  
RICHARD J. SIMMONS  
CHRISTOPHER SPROUL  
RANDALL D. SPRAGUE  
TIM SYLVESTER  
JACK LOYD GRISHAM 
JAMES H. GREEN  
GARRETT GRUENER  
GEROLD LEE GORMAN  
RICH GOSSE  
LEO GALLAGHER  
JOE GUZZARDI  
JON W. ZELLHOEFER  
PAUL NAVE  
ROBERT C. NEWMAN II  
BRIAN TRACY  
A. LAVAR TAYLOR  
WILLIAM TSANGARES  
PATRICIA G. TILLEY  
DIANE BEALL TEMPLIN  
MARY "MARY CAREY" COOK  
GARY COLEMAN  
TODD CARSON  
PETER MIGUEL CAMEJO  
WILLIAM "BILL" S. CHAMBERS  
MICHAEL CHELI  
ROBERT CULLENBINE  
D. (LOGAN DARROW) 
CLEMENTS  
S. ISSA  
BOB LYNN EDWARDS  
ERIC KOREVAAR  
STEPHEN L. KNAPP  
KELLY P. KIMBALL  
D.E. KESSINGER  
EDWARD "ED" KENNEDY  
TREK THUNDER KELLY  
JERRY KUNZMAN  
PETER V. UEBERROTH  
BILL PRADY  
DARIN PRICE  
GREGORY J. PAWLIK  
LEONARD PADILLA  
RONALD JASON PALMIERI  
CHARLES "CHUCK" PINEDA JR.  
HEATHER PETERS  
ROBERT "BUTCH" DOLE  
SCOTT DAVIS  
RONALD J. FRIEDMAN  
GENE FORTE  
DIANA FOSS  
LORRAINE (ABNER ZURD) 
FONTANES  
WARREN FARRELL  
DAN FEINSTEIN  
LARRY FLYNT  
CALVIN Y. LOUIE  
DICK LANE  
TODD RICHARD LEWIS  
GARY LEONARD  
SPACE FOR WRITE-IN 
CANDIDATE 
 
